The first thing that caught my attention was the sheer number of people sacrificing their hard-earned (or, in some cases, ill-earned) money at green baize table after green baize table, each of which was being officiated over by an expressionless croupier, unfazed by either the scale of the losses or the occasional lucky triumph. Despite the splendour of some of the venues and the extreme tackiness of the others, both trying to make it all seem respectable, there was something quite disturbing about this industrialised fleecing of the general public, however willing the victims were.

Then, donning my security hat for a moment, I started to consider the security infrastructure that must be in place when the financial stakes are so high. Suddenly the number of scrutineers roaming the floors became apparent; the technologies deployed, however, remained a mystery. All I could do was assume that a sophisticated CCTV surveillance system with the latest in video analytics was in situ.

I had entered the casino through what had appeared to be an ornamental archway; but, it was only when I exited that I realised that the archway was not the Graecko-Roman portal it purported to be, but rather it was a 21^st Century archway metal detector. I had been screened on entry without even knowing it.

OK, it’s not so shocking. After all, we are all routinely screened whilst oblivious to the invasion of our privacy. In London, commuters are reported to be captured on more than 100 different cameras on each journey they make into the city. Meanwhile, Google’s Street View project has been happily snapping photographs of our homes, and the odd passer-by, without our say so; many of the images of those people recorded in the process, some in amorous poses on street corners, are now the subject of art exhibits.  Our conversations are recorded “for training purposes” when we make telephone calls for services and our personal preferences and geographical location are analysed every time we go online. And we comply…as we have little say in the matter.

Even in airports we undergo surveillance without any pomp and ceremony. Arrive at a British airport and, on going through Customs, you are likely to be screened on the move by passive millimetre wave systems. And in Russia, technologies are deployed at every international airport to detect radioactive materials. In neither of these cases are there overt warning signs or alternative search procedures offered. Yet, when it comes to security screening on departure, the story is very different as we go overboard to explain to people what is going to happen to them.

The airport checkpoint is considered to be of fundamental importance not only to ensuring security in the skies but also in preventing an attack against a State that could have a cataclysmic knock-on effect. In previous editorials I have addressed the civil liberties debate which is never far from the headlines, but the issue of transparency is one rarely touched on, but of equal importance.

The terrorist, like a good poker player, keeps his cards close to his chest. We know what he might or might not have, but we have no idea as to which approach he will take, or when he will take it. We, on the other hand, play with an open hand. Not only do we tell the passengers which technologies we are going to use and when we are going to use them, we go further by advertising the specific make and model of the technologies deployed.

Even in the futuristic Checkpoint of the Future, being a concept I consider long overdue, we are already indicating that certain categories of passengers will be screened by whole body imaging systems (if the law permits!) whilst others will only be subject to screening by an archway metal detector; and, some bags will be screened by X-ray and others by more advanced explosive trace detection technologies.

Surely if we are to make security unpredictable, we need to deploy a casino-style screening system, which has the added benefit of being aesthetically more pleasing? Our screening technologies ought to be part and parcel of the architectural design of the airport. There is no need for makes and models of X-ray machines to be on view; they help nobody other than the terrorist who can simply research the product, and thereby its limitations, at the manufacturers website. Nobody is going to buy a CEIA metal detector rather than a Garrett one, or vice versa, because they see the name emblazoned on the equipment at an airport checkpoint…so why tell people who made the portal, or even that it is a portal?

Of course, the speed at which people flow through the checkpoint is impacted upon by the efficiency of the process of divesting metallic products from the person to avoid unnecessary alarms. So we will still need to tell passengers how to prepare for security, but that does not equate to telling people which technology they will be screened by or even, in a tunnel configuration, the precise point in time that they are being screened.

And, talking of instructing passengers, I am still amazed at the obvious cost-saving, security-diminishing procedure used in certain States of telling passengers how to place their bags on the X-ray conveyor belt, granting them, in the process, complete control over the angle at which the X-ray beam will hit their bags.

The stakes are high and the chips are down. Now it’s our turn to play with a poker face.

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Clemens Jilek, Stelios Tzeis and Christian Kolb present their research into the safety of using hand-held metal detectors to screen passengers with implanted pacemakers or cardioverter-defibrillators.

Pacemaker and cardioverter defibrillator systems are routinely used for the treatment of cardiac arrhythmias. Function of these cardiac rhythm devices can be impaired by electromagnetic interference from devices and systems emitting magnetic fields, such as cellular phones (1), MP3-players, 50/60 Hz alternating current, induction ovens, and anti-theft protection devices (2, 3).

Security screening at airports has intensified over the last decade, following the 11^th September 2001 attacks.  Metal detectors are routinely used for detection of ferrous items on passengers. They create a magnetic field that might interfere with implanted cardiac rhythm devices. Therefore people with implanted pacemakers or cardioverter-defibrillators are routinely advised to avoid screening with metal detectors, due to the risk of possible electromagnetic interference. Is concern justified?

We have previously shown that metal detector gates are safe for patients with cardiac rhythm devices (4): A total of 345 people, 200 with implanted pacemakers and 145 with implanted cardioverter-defibrillators, were tested with an airport metal detector gate – CEIA’s Model 02PN10 – creating a maximal electromagnetic ?ux density of 42 ?T. No electromagnetic interference was observed. However security protocols dictate that once metal detector gates indicate the presence of ferrous material, hand-held metal detectors should be used to verify and locate the suspected object of interest. The US Food and Drug Administration has reported 44 instances of possible interference between hand-held metal detectors or anti-theft protection devices and cardiac rhythm device systems (5).

The objective of our study was to systematically assess the risk of electromagnetic interference between two broadly used hand-held metal detectors and implanted pacemakers and cardioverter-defibrillators.

Methods

Patients presenting for routine follow-up of pacemaker or cardioverter-defibrillator function in two hospitals (German Heart Center Munich, Germany and Henry Dunant Hospital Athens, Greece) between September 2009 and December 2010 were screened for participation. A proper device function was obligatory before testing with hand-held metal detectors. The device parameters were changed to make interferences obvious in the connected electrocardiogram for pacemakers and cardioverter-defibrillators and to make the detection of arrhythmias more likely for cardioverter-defibrillators. Informed consent was obtained from all patients before testing for interference with the hand-held metal detectors. The study was approved by each of the local ethics committees.

Hand-held metal detectors

We tested two commercially available hand-held metal detectors that are widely used in Europe: a PD 140 device (CEIA S.p.A., Arezzo, Italy) that is usually used at airports, and a MH 5 device (Vallon GmbH, Eningen, Germany) that is mainly used in public services. We programmed both at maximal sensitivity (PD 140 maximal electromagnetic ?ux density 3.82 ?T, MH 5 maximal electromagnetic ?ux density 6.3 ?T).

Test protocol

Patients were examined in supine position under continuous 12-lead electrocardiogram (ECG) monitoring. Documentation of stored and programmed parameters was performed before and after exposure to the hand-held metal detectors to detect changes in parameter settings or inappropriate function. During continuous ECG recording, we swiped the activated hand-held PD 140 and MH 5 metal detector on the skin above the cardiac rhythm device and along the lead(s) for ?30 seconds.

Results

388 patients (mean age 66±15yrs, 76% males) participated in the study. 209 patients had pacemaker systems, comprising 81 devices from 37 model families of 11 manufacturers corresponding to 73% of all pacemaker families available on the market within the last ten years. 179 patients had cardioverter-defibrillator devices, comprising 61 devices from 26 model families of 7 manufacturers corresponding to 76% of cardioverter-defibrillator families available on the market within the last ten years.

We observed no abnormal pacemaker or cardioverter-defibrillator system function during or after exposure to handheld metal detectors. For a detailed list of the device models please see the original article in the Annals of Internal Medicine (6).

Discussion

In this assessment of interference between commonly used hand-held metal detectors and a variety of cardiac rhythm devices we were unable to identify any adverse effects of use on cardiac device function. We aimed to maximise the likelihood of interference by using the highest possible magnetic field of two commonly used hand-held metal detectors and by increasing the duration of exposure to 30 seconds per testing, which by far exceeds conventional screening durations. Aiming to increase the generalisability of our results, we used in our testing protocol two commercially available, widely applied, hand-held metal detectors with different strengths of magnetic field and technical characteristics similar to those of other hand-held metal detector systems used for screening procedures.

Our results are consistent with previous studies which showed no electromagnetic interference when device recipients walked through metal detector gates which cause an electromagnetic field of even higher strength compared to hand-held metal detectors (4, 7).

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One of the long-standing challenges of the aviation industry has been how the image of those personnel who, arguably, proffer the last line of defence in the management of a terrorist or unruly passenger incident in-flight, can be transformed from that of a trolley dolly into one of a safety and security professional. Pilots are often portrayed as the guardians of security in the skies whilst, beyond the flight deck door, the flight attendants’ image is still that of a glorified waitress. Sherry Saehlenou discusses the problem and the solutions.

I am on a plane as I write this. It has been a decade since 11^th September 2001, the day that air travel, as we knew it, changed. Since that day the airline industry has made many important advances in closing loopholes in our security systems, enforcing strict regulations on air travel and increasing public awareness. Air travellers have become more ‘security minded’ as they arrive at the airport, walk though the terminals, go through the intensive security screening, board their flights and settle into their seats. But does our “security mindset” tend to stop there? Unfortunately, many times it does.

What do you think of when I say ‘flight attendant?’ I’m willing to bet that the image of a uniformed safety professional wrestling an unruly passenger to the floor and handcuffing him/her to the seat leg isn’t the first thing that pops to mind. Who hasn’t seen the numerous in-flight videos on the internet featuring rapping, dancing flight attendants, nearly nude flight attendants (covered with head to toe body paint), or even fitness gurus, rugby teams, and little kids giving the in-flight safety briefing? As clever and entertaining as these marketing campaigns are, it’s no wonder that it’s sometimes hard to take the flight attendant’s security role seriously after all that.

The sad fact remains that even after the heroic actions of those flight attendants who also lost their lives that September day in 2001, after all the talk about flight attendants being ‘the first line of defence,’ after the precision-trained cabin crew saved passengers’ lives on the Hudson, and after both the shoe and the underwear bombers’ attempts were, in part, thwarted by cabin crews, flight attendants still have to combat the general perception that they are there to entertain and serve.

To answer the question “Are flight attendants regarded as ‘service providers’ or ‘safety professionals?’ it helps to examine the point of view of each group that makes up a part of the flight attendant’s working world.

Airline Passengers

With that question in mind, I set about to do some informal interviews of my own. I queried passengers sitting next to me each time I flew, I brought the subject up at dinner parties, and I asked my friends outside the industry. Each time I asked the question, the response was the same: a detailed description of a recent flight where the flight attendants didn’t smile or the onboard service was bad. No one gave the question further thought. At one dinner party, however, a ‘techie’ summed up his attitude eloquently by comparing in-flight safety to working on a computer. “When you use a computer you have an anti-virus programme on it,” he explained, “which allows you to do your work, knowing that you are protected from viruses and malware. You don’t see the software but you know it is there and you depend on it. Flight attendants are like that. You know that they are expertly trained to react in an emergency and that knowledge allows you to relax and enjoy your flight.”  Brilliant analogy, but unfortunately a view not shared by many.

On a recent flight I was sitting next to a couple seated in the emergency exit row. The flight attendant appeared and asked if we had all read the safety information card and if we were ready to assist in an evacuation in case of an emergency? We all responded yes. Then, when the flight attendant walked away, the wife turned to her husband and asked, “What card?”

Fellow Crew Members

The attitude of pilots towards flight attendants is difficult to assess. Most pilots I have worked with seemed to respect the job of the flight attendant, or at least outwardly. The best ones to work with give thorough flight briefings, including all the flight attendants on the crew, emphasising that they are all one team on board and want to know when something happens in the cabin that doesn’t look right. There are many pilots who really count on, and respect, the security and safety skills of the flight attendants in the back and treat them accordingly. There are far too many, however, that don’t.

Last week I attended a conference, on an unrelated subject, where I met a pilot who was still flying for the same airline where I previously worked as a flight attendant. We figured out that we probably had worked together several times carrying passengers between Paris and Washington DC. It was at that point that he actually told me, with a chuckle, how the flight deck refers to flight attendants: ‘Airbags’, ‘CDs’ (because they are wide, spanning the aisles from the C to the D seats), and of course my favourite – ‘hostitutes’.

Recently a disturbing incident made the news, involving a 737 pilot for a major airline in the US. This pilot, on an open mic, broadcast a rant against flight attendants over the ATC frequency in which he called flight attendants “a bunch of gays, grannies and grandees.” He continued talking (even after being told his mic was on) about meeting some of the crew members after the flight and how increasingly difficult it is to find flight attendants he wanted to sleep with. He continued, “There’s only a handful of cute chicks … I only found one that was probably doable.”

How did the company handle the situation? The pilot was reprimanded, sent to ‘diversity training’ and suspended for an undisclosed amount of time. This brings us to probably the most influential group in the flight attendant’s world – the one that could make the most difference in promoting the image of flight attendants as safety professionals – the companies they work for.

The Company

Unfortunately most companies think of flight attendants in terms of ‘marketing’ rather than ‘safety.’ Granted, customer service is important and is a large part of what flight attendants do and no company wants to emphasise the fact that you are travelling at 500 mph 35,000 feet in the air where many things could go wrong, but I’d be willing to bet that there would be no flight attendants on board at all in the United States if it weren’t for a FAA ruling stipulating the ratio of flight attendants to passengers on commercial airline flights. The FAA has reasons why they require flight attendants on board, and specify the ratio. It isn’t to pass out pretzels.

Candace Kolander, coordinator for air safety health and security for the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), testified before the Subcommittee on Aviation in Washington DC, that “Years of cultural attitudes have often relegated flight attendants to nothing more than ‘servers in the sky’ in the eyes of some. In fact, airline management is more than willing to spend money to add more and more customer service and sales type training for flight attendants. Yet at the same time the trend has been to squeeze all the required emergency safety and security training into as little time in the classroom as possible. Flight attendant classroom emergency training hours have been reduced to the bare minimum allowed by the regulations.” (Kolander 2009)

It does seem to be that the image of flight attendants is weighted heavily on the side of the ‘service provider.’ In fact, the only group that regards flight attendants as true ‘safety professionals’ appears to be the flight attendants themselves. What can be done, then, to bring the safety image of this group sharply into focus? Despite the best efforts of the flight attendants, the change in attitude needs to start from the top in terms of legislation, training and serious certification.

A Shift in Attitude

To start to change the perception of flight attendants from ‘trolley dollies’ to ‘safety and security professionals’ requires the industry to take the role of flight attendants seriously and implement training programmes, work rules and to provide equipment that will support them in their role as safety professionals.

Cabin crews annually go through programmes that test their knowledge of the specific airplanes in their fleet, use of emergency equipment on board, evacuation procedures, first aid, CPR, fire fighting, explosives on board, and special passenger handling. Training, however, varies from airline to airline and country to country. Some major airlines have robust crew resource management training (CRM), for example, and some carriers hold a two hour session just to ‘check a box’ on the training roster – if, indeed, they have it at all.

Commercial airlines are now looking at their training programmes, through the lens of saving money and resources, in order to comply with regulating authorities’ increasingly strict guidelines. Advanced qualification programmes (AQP) are being designed to help the airlines manage training of large flight attendant populations and the varied curricula necessary for certification. Today more depth and a higher level of skills and knowledge is now required of flight attendants Even with redesigned training programmes and new federal regulations there still remains a desperate need to provide training in important, much-neglected areas that affect onboard safety and security such as: communication, situational awareness, behavioural risk assessment, self-defence tactics, cultural diversity, and sleep and fatigue management. 

Improved Communication

The ability of flight attendants to communicate with the flight deck is fundamental to safety, however, the flight deck barriers put in place after 9/11 have seriously degraded the quality of communication between the two, calling for a review of past procedures and an earnest look at improving this critical element of security.

CRM encompasses many aspects of communication (situational awareness, behaviour recognition and decision making). Most airline companies do have a required CRM programme in place, and some even combine pilots and flight attendants in the same session, however for most it is reduced to a “just-check-the-box” training event that both groups put up with for two hours.

Lori Brown, professor and researcher at Western Michigan University, has significantly contributed to the airline community in her present role as researcher in air crew safety and security. Her background as a flight attendant, pilot, and ground instructor as well as her degree in Human Factors in Aviation qualifies her to pose some serious questions concerning the state of security in the cabin. She has studied CRM issues and communication between flight attendants and the flight deck in depth and concludes that, “The cabin crew is essential to the safety of the aircraft and passengers. Effective communication and synergy between the flight deck and cabin crew has never been more significant and challenging.” (Brown 2010)

Still, airlines have been slow to revamp their CRM programmes and most crews see what’s offered as a waste of time. Lack of improved, joint (pilot/flight attendant) training creates a gap in communication and coordination which has already been impeded by the flight deck door.

Effective Security Training

Following 9/11, the US Congress specifically acknowledged the urgent need for flight attendant security training with the air Transportation Security Act (2001), Homeland Security Act (2002), and the FAA Reauthorisation Act (2003). This legislation called for a basic, mandatory level of security training including provisions for crew communication and coordination, terrorist psychology and basic moves for self-defence. There was also a provision that the TSA must further develop regulations and guidelines for a more aggressive method of self-defence training to be more physical in nature. At the last minute the language for the basic security training was changed from “the TSA shall issue these guidelines” to “the TSA may issue these guidelines.” With the change of just one word, TSA industry-wide guidelines were removed. The result: some airlines have succeeded in keeping flight attendant security training almost non-existent.

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Graeme Harrison discusses the importance of building the right technology into airports and how effective communication can be the difference between success and failure during an emergency.

The world of air travel has changed completely over the last decade. Airports around the world have been transformed with the introduction of high tech safety and security systems. Body scanners, biometric readers, iris recognition systems, CCTV cameras and even behavioural screening technology are now all part of a massive safety and security operation that aims to identify and manage issues before they become a problem. Mountains of data are produced not only by these technical systems, but also by human intelligence, which all need to be collated and analysed quickly and accurately by airport staff.

However, while the data is crucial to identify any potential threats, in the event of an alert, what is required is that the right messages be delivered to the right location at the right time. This minimises disruption and ensures a ‘business as usual’ attitude even in a major crisis. This includes transferring the travelling public from the scene to a safe zone and moving experts in as quickly as possible. What is needed, therefore, is a communication system that is able to organise human traffic quickly and efficiently.

All-in-One Communication

In these days of heightened transportation security, clear communication is more essential than ever. Public address, paging, messaging and music systems must do more than facilitate travel. Mumbled passenger announcements over crackling speakers can be hard to understand and easily missed when competing with loud background noises and the multi-sensory distractions within airports. Crisp, clear audio that cuts through audio congestion is vital to managing communications for both everyday and unexpected events.

What is more, airports are structures unlike any other buildings, in that virtually all of their users are unfamiliar with the surroundings. They feature a myriad of terminals, walkways, security zones, lounges, shopping areas, restaurants, runways and even bus and train terminals. Even a frequent traveller that regularly uses a particular airport will only be familiar with a fraction of the vast structure. This means in case of an emergency or security alert, risk managers cannot afford to assume that the public has any familiarity with the surroundings.

It is clear to see, therefore, that the traditional ‘ringing bell’ alarm system for use as a security alert is now woefully inadequate. A bell cannot inform travellers or staff on specific threats and how to act. In case of an incident in one area, it is important to be able to inform people on the ground quickly and efficiently on what to do and where to go, without causing chaos or disruption elsewhere in the facility. Moreover, communication systems need to have the ability to reach different areas with different messages, and even different messages for different audiences. Staff may have to receive a call-to-action, while the travelling public may have to be told to move calmly to a specific location.

Take the scenario of a fire in a restaurant located in the departure lounge. A number of things must be done immediately – contain the fire, send for experts and get the general public to safety.  With a unified communications and Voice Evacuation Alarm System (VES), a command centre is able to respond fast by producing announcements tailored to the specific area, ensuring the location can be evacuated in an orderly manner, with passengers and staff knowing exactly where to go, while clearly instructing the experts at the same time. All this needs to take place whilst ensuring flights can arrive and depart with minimal delays. Clearly, the old bell system is not sufficient for the new, complex threat landscape that exists today. Unfortunately, the infrastructures of many airports have still not caught up with the modern day safety and security requirements.

Old and Disjointed: the communication systems of the past

With a few exceptions of new airports built on green field sites that include state-of-the-art facilities in their construction, most airports have grown organically, adding new terminals, driveways and facilities over time. This has often lead to disjointed, legacy communications systems that have to be managed in isolation from each other. What’s more, making upgrades or reconfiguring alerts are time consuming and expensive as they require a great deal of human intervention. However, with today’s strict security requirements, it is important to have a communication system that is unified and can be centrally controlled. An infrastructure that is fully networked also means that, in case of a fault in the system, the problem can be identified and addressed very quickly, which is more of a challenge with a traditional, dispersed system.

Airports Becoming Networked 

Having realised that their old, disjointed and patchy communications infrastructures are not up to the challenges of the new world order, some airports have already started to take steps towards a unified media system that improves communication and security across their entire infrastructure.

The Erik Nielsen Whitehorse International Airport in Canada, for example, has introduced a network-based audio paging system that uses Power-over-Ethernet (PoE) for a highly networked, flexible and scalable communications infrastructure. Whitehorse benefits from technology, including combined distribution processing and page routing, as well as networked audio and control. Using standard Ethernet networking technology, the system includes a highly adaptable and scalable communication system that is centrally monitored yet can be localised, or zoned, to the smallest of areas.

The networked approach eliminates a single point of system failure, allowing for decentralised design and a system that is expandable from a single paging station and can be amplified to a more complex paging system across several zones and multiple buildings. In terms of end-user benefits, staff can produce live, delayed and recorded announcements, take advantage of system-wide alarms and event logging, message store and forward as well as background music routing. This type of system architecture enables airports to combine their general entertainment infrastructure, as well as their security and safety communication, all under one stable, reliable and highly resilient network.

While Wellington International Airport in New Zealand has also taken a similar approach to Whitehorse, at Hong Kong International Airport, Cathay Pacific, which owns several large lounges widely dispersed across the airport, has implemented a network-based system in order to share music channels between lounges, as well as having the ability to make system-wide pages in the event of an emergency. For implementation, the airline was able to harness the existing fibre backbone already in place in the airport’s building fabric.

Evacuation Strategies: what to look out for

An integral part of an airport’s communication system is an evacuation procedure that is tightly integrated with the overall communications infrastructure. It goes without saying that any system with such a vital part to play in the welfare of passengers and staff must be completely resilient. For this reason a network-based, decentralised system is the clear choice. As noted earlier, a centralised system introduces the risk of a single connection failure bringing down the entire system. In the case of a large airport, a decentralised system can make all the difference. For example, using a centralised alarm infrastructure over large areas increases the risk of a system failure. But the self contained, intelligent end-points of a decentralised, network-based system remove this risk making it substantially more reliable. Scalability is another key benefit; as airports are expanded or renovated it is a smarter investment to ensure any safety system is able to scale upwards to meet future needs.

A sophisticated VES can use real-time information to make sure that passengers are directed along an exit route that best avoids danger. For example in the case of an airport terminal evacuation, the technology manager may wish to direct people of one terminal to the west exits while at the same time work to move the passengers of an alternative terminal towards the eastern exits. In this instance it is vital that a VES provides zone management capabilities. This will allow location-appropriate information to be accurately communicated as needed.

Adaptability

Part of the difficulty in providing technology for airport evacuations is that each facility is unique and constantly evolving. This means any solution must ensure that it is both bespoke and future proof.

Any communications system used must include both a highly customisable interface and hardware. In terms of the interface, it must be equipped with an easily tailored paging feature to provide both pre-recorded and live voice messages. The mapping or zoning of these messages need to match the current schematics of a building, as well as any changes that may be needed should structures be added or the facility’s design reconfigured in any way.

What’s more, when evaluating a potential communications system, a technology manger should look for one that has remote supervision capabilities. Being able to access the system remotely allows the technology manager to properly and effectively monitor the entire system real-time – gaining greater resource efficiencies.

Arguably one the most advanced ways voice alarm technology can contribute to a safe and orderly evacuation is through ambient noise detection. By sensing and measuring sound levels within a space and adjusting subsequent message sound levels, the VES ensures that messages can be heard and are not drowned out by a loud environment. This guarantees that a facility’s occupants are notified as quickly and as clearly as possible. Similarly, in quieter areas the system is able to accommodate the message volume in order to prevent startling or panicking passengers.

Standards

Given the complexity, sophistication and importance of a media system that has an integrated voice alarm network, it is imperative any system installed comes from a partner you can trust. Moreover, any technology partner supplying you should be one that can ensure the network will not only be installed correctly but will be fully maintained and supported throughout its usage. It’s also vital to ensure that any prospective system is fully up to date with all current compliance standards and guidelines, including EN 54-16 product certification.  This is a standard for all new buildings that incorporate a VES – if the system does not have the certification it cannot be used for emergency voice evacuation purposes. Standardising the industry means that users can be sure that no matter what the product, it will perform as they require it, in conjunction with the rest of the system. Without standardisation and product certification, users run the risk of investing in expensive systems that do not perform as needed when required – a potentially fatal flaw when it comes to airport safety and security.

Conclusion

Unlike any other public space, an airport is probably the most difficult public facility to control and secure. With thousands of passengers moving through a myriad of corridors and walk-ways, they are likely to be unfamiliar with their surroundings, while the vast, disjointed building structures may prove to be difficult to monitor.

While most of the focus placed in airports lies with identifying security alerts, it is just as important to put a communication system in place that enables for fast response times and orderly evacuation in case of a security emergency.

Expecting varied communication systems to work together, be centrally managed, and be highly flexible in message distribution means an airport will be able to deal quickly and efficiently with any security alert or emergency situation. A networked voice evacuation and paging system should therefore be an integral part of the security and control infrastructure command of any airport. 

Graeme Harrison is Vice President for International Sales at Biamp Systems 

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The use of analytics has evolved beyond fulfilling basic security needs to include advanced features such as traffic monitoring functions and detection of left luggage within transportation hubs.

On a basic level, the ability of analytics to identify the movement and speed of vehicles and people, as opposed to other spurious objects, lends the technology to monitoring of perimeters and suspicious behaviour within defined areas. Clearly, there is a requirement for security alerts where there is a danger of cars or pedestrians entering hazardous or restricted zones, such as airport runways.

Left luggage poses a specific security threat in airports and, as such, has become an increasing area of interest for airport operators and governments. In the United Kingdom, the Home Office’s Imagery Library for Intelligent Detection Systems (i-LIDS) certification contains a specific scenario relating to detection and tracking of objects. Video analytics can alert security guards to packages and luggage left within a scene, which otherwise may go undetected in the midst of multiple CCTV screens.  Similarly, the software can highlight instances of theft, where objects have been removed from a scene.

Wider Acceptance

Recently, a number of factors have contributed to an increase in interest and demand, enabling video analytics to be reconsidered as a viable video surveillance option. The growing transition from analogue to networked CCTV has seen a wider acceptance of digital solutions, including analytics, leading to further benefits in terms of being able to monitor and manage systems from remote locations.

More importantly, end users and integrators were historically unable to refer to a standard, or accreditation, for analytics systems in order to judge their effectiveness before purchase. This was the case until the introduction of the Home Office’s i-LIDS certification.

i-LIDS is the UK government’s benchmark standard for video analytics technology and is awarded to security products judged to have met the stringent criteria specified by the Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB) in the development of video based detection systems for government use.

Manufacturers meeting the highest level of performance classification receive the i-LIDS accreditation, which is the first real independent measure of the quality and functionality of a video analytics system.

Improving the Security Function

When the costs of manned guarding and operators are considered, it’s tempting when assessing analytics to assume that the number of security staff can be immediately reduced by introducing the technology. Perhaps it’s more appropriate to view video analytics as a way to improve the efficiency of operators and guards.

It has been proven that CCTV operators begin to miss significant events after monitoring video footage for more than twenty to thirty minutes. This effect is multiplied by the large number of screens that operators are now required to monitor in a control room environment.  Analytics can be used to assist in highlighting notable events, thereby allowing operators to do what they do best; deciding whether an incident is suspicious or not. Security functions can therefore handle more cameras more effectively with their existing staff.  The job of monitoring is also made more stimulating, removing the need to constantly survey a wall of video screens for long periods.

In replacing guards with yet more cameras, the net effect is to create more footage and screens for the operators to monitor.  Supporting the guards with analytics means the ability to switch guards to mobile patrols based on analytics incidents, covering a larger area more effectively and responding to real incidents more quickly, rather than just following a routine guard tour. Above all, analytics also enables security teams to highlight potential risk situations that are taking place and have patrols pre-empt and prevent incidents rather than just respond after an incident has occurred.

Perimeter Protection

There are a number of video analytics packages available in the market today, all offering a multitude of capabilities, and not always linked to security.  However, the majority of installed systems have focused on one of video analytics’ core competencies: perimeter intrusion detection systems. Security officials at airports around the world need to deliver powerful intrusion detection systems that secure their sites perimeters, provide electronic access control, and supply integrated video assessment solutions for unmatched site protection.

These can supplement fences, or replace external PIRs, seismic detectors etc., allowing the user to identify specific areas where intruders will be identified. Potentially this includes virtual ‘fence’ lines that will trigger when an intruder climbs over it (rather than when a guard patrols along it), tripwires that trigger when crossed in specific directions and alert areas, such as nearby roads, which will trigger if a car-sized object dwells in them for too long. Combining these rules ensures only suspicious behaviours trigger the alarms and not spurious objects such as the local wildlife or weather related effects.

Eliminating such false alarms in a sterile zone is a primary test in the HOSDB’s evaluation of video analytics systems. This specific scenario continues to be a much demanded i-LIDS accreditation as increasing numbers of end users and integrators realise the performance and cost benefits of video analytics in perimeter detection type applications.

Return on Investment

Although attracted by the benefits of video analytics, security managers have always faced challenges in justifying the investment in what has been perceived as a premium technology. One method of providing a clear return on investment is to look at the existing costs for a business, or its losses.

Prevention is almost always cheaper than cure. Although not a universal panacea, the ability of analytics to highlight suspicious behaviour and let operators react to and prevent them from turning into incidents rather than just reviewing video to help catch suspects or manage incidents after the event, can provide quick returns in avoiding loss and damage.

Daniel Wan is Channel Marketing Leader UK at Honeywell Security Group. Honeywell’s new Active Alert v4.7 video analytics solution, has been evaluated by the UK Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB) and awarded i-LIDS accreditation both as a primary detection system in an operational alert role and as an event based recording system for sterile zone monitoring applications.

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Introduction

In its early days, CBT was conducted on standalone computers and training was delivered via floppy disks. A sometimes still used definition of CBT refers to standalone computer mediated training which is delivered using CD ROMs or DVDs. The term web-based training (WBT) emerged for training conducted via the internet using a web browser. E-learning refers to all kinds of electronically supported and mediated learning although the term is now often linked to learning and training activities using internet technology. In the more recent literature the terms CBT, WBT and e-learning are often applied similarly or even interchangeably. A broader definition of CBT refers to all forms of self-paced distance training and learning activities using computers. In this article this broad definition is used in contrast to training delivered by an instructor in a classroom.

Advantages of CBT

Several advantages have been associated with CBT compared to traditional class room training. CBT can be developed once and then be used to train a large number of people in a standardised way. This is especially relevant for skills, knowledge and competencies in aviation security that are required uniformly in different countries. While in classroom training, learning progress is determined by the instructor and the whole class, CBT is self-paced. This means that learners can progress at their own speed and repeat course content as needed which can make training more efficient. In addition, CBT can be individually adaptive, so that learning sessions are created by sophisticated algorithms taking into account learning progress and individual strengths and weaknesses. This is of particular importance in x-ray image recognition training where x-ray screeners have to learn how to recognise a large number of prohibited items in different rotations (e.g., Schwaninger, 2004b; Koller et al., 2008). Modern CBT features multimedia including images, text, audio, video, and allows activating multiple senses which increases knowledge retention (e.g., seeing the explosion of an improvised explosive device (IED) made with 50 vs. 500 g of TNT in a video will be memorised much better than when a trainer explains it). CBT systems can adapt to different learning styles by presenting information in audio, visually or both. Customisation is possible by allowing students to focus on course content that they do not know yet or is of particular importance to them (e.g. if cabin baggage screeners are trained in hold baggage screening). Modern CBT provides user interaction, like in computer games, which can make training more interesting and motivating than listening to an instructor. Moreover, using sophisticated computer simulation, responses to situations can be trained which in reality would be dangerous and/or expensive (like for example flying and landing an aircraft in different weather conditions). CBT allows measuring learning progress and acquired skills, knowledge and competencies using objective, fair, reliable, valid and standardised tests, which is difficult to achieve by an instructor alone (for the assessment of x-ray image interpretation competency see Koller and Schwaninger, 2006; Schwaninger et al. 2006). Finally, well developed CBT provides feedback to students on their learning progress which increases motivation.

Other advantages of CBT compared to traditional classroom training are not yet fully available in aviation security training. If CBT is delivered over the internet, students can learn at home. This means substantial cost savings because no scheduling is needed and costs for training facilities, instructors, travel fees and student materials can be saved. However, since aviation security course content often contains security sensitive information and because current CBT systems do not feature the high level of security such as, for example, internet banking applications (secure internet connection, authentication using mTAN, etc.) this advantage is still limited in aviation security training.

Problems and solutions

There are several reasons why CBT still is not as widely used as it could be in many sectors and particularly in aviation security. Most of these issues can be overcome by using modern CBT technology in combination with face to face interaction and instruction (blended learning).

Most adults are not used to CBT because they only know and are used to traditional classroom instruction from school. This problem can be substantially reduced by providing a face to face introduction in order to motivate students at the very beginning and explaining to them the many benefits of CBT. If this is followed by an interesting game-like session including multimedia and an instructor who helps students using the system, the introduction can be very successful. Critics of CBT have pointed out that people cannot ask questions, which limits its effectiveness. With blended learning this problem can be reduced by conducting periodical classroom sessions in which the learning content is discussed both in groups and with the instructor. Hands-on exercises further increase knowledge acquisition and retention and allow transfer into practical skills. In addition, modern CBT provides collaborative technology in which students can exchange information in discussion groups, create a wiki, ask questions to the instructor etc. A problem with these modern CBT technologies is that current generations of aviation security personnel are not used to it. However, this will most probably change in some years, if one takes into account that most teenagers of today are frequently using web 2.0 technologies such as Facebook, Twitter, , etc. Finally, sceptics of CBT have pointed out that quality of learning cannot be as high as when delivered by an instructor. This potential draw back can be substantially reduced when CBT is developed in close collaboration between subject matter experts, instructional designers, graphic artists and good programmers.

What makes a good CBT?

As shown in the previous sections, the potential of CBT is huge both in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Unfortunately, many current solutions are of low to medium quality, which is especially true in aviation security. An important reason is that in order to create good CBT, substantial resources and knowledge is needed. First, a needs and task analysis has to be conducted in order to determine which skills, knowledge and competencies are required to achieve good job performance. To do this properly in aviation security, especially for tasks which entail a lot of human-machine interaction (e.g. working at a security checkpoint), human factors knowledge and expertise is required. Another important step is defining training objectives (desired outcomes of the CBT activity). This is relevant both for instructional designers and developers and is essential in order to be able to evaluate the training properly. Special attention should be paid to instructional design which often uses a blended learning approach in which CBT is combined with classroom training (e.g., Sury et al., 2011). A good CBT also requires graphic designers who develop intuitive screen designs, user friendly interaction as well as motivating and effective multimedia content. Aviation security subject matter experts are essential in order to provide accurate learning content. The CBT package is usually created using authoring software or general purpose software such as Microsoft Silverlight or Adobe Flash. A good CBT contains lessons, questions as well as pre- and post-tests in order to provide feedback to the learner, to measure learning progress and training effectiveness. Sophisticated systems are individually adaptive (e.g. Schwaninger, 2004b) and provide means for reviewing course content and customisation. If appropriate, CBT can be designed like a computer game, sometimes even featuring realistic computer simulation.

In short, creating good CBT requires profound knowledge in different areas, substantial resources and carefully structured and planned collaboration in the development and management process.

Limitations of CBT

Not everything can be learned using CBT. There are many skills which require interaction with and feedback from a subject matter expert in order to achieve and maintain good performance on the job. While the knowledge about how to react correctly if an improvised explosive device is identified in  cabin baggage can be acquired using CBT, it is a different matter to react properly at a real aviation security checkpoint. Another example is the pat down search. In theory, the procedure can be learned using CBT but whether a security officer is able to conduct the pat down properly needs to be verified by an instructor.

As explained in previous sections, for many applications, CBT should be combined with traditional classroom instruction in order to be effective (blended learning). This should entail  face to face instruction at the beginning and guidance during the first CBT lessons. It is a good idea to define deadlines until when certain CBT courses have to be completed, including computer-based and practical tests to verify an increase in knowledge, skills and competencies. Periodical classroom sessions allow students to ask questions and review key aspects in the group and with the instructor. CBT needs to be closely related to the job and linked to specific on the job performance objectives. If students have successfully completed a CBT programme this does not yet guarantee that they apply the acquired knowledge and skills later on the job. Efforts should be made so that students can apply the acquired knowledge and skills as soon as possible on the job and this should be verified by an instructor who can provide feedback in addition to the CBT, which should be made available for reviewing and refreshing even after completion. In short, the effectiveness of CBT relies largely on the preparation, planning and management that go with it.

Evaluation of training programmes

Evaluation is essential in order to determine the quality of training programmes and whether they meet the required learning objectives. This section contains key points based on a recent paper on training evaluation in aviation security (Sury & Schwaninger, 2011). For training evaluation to be effective, it needs to be an integral part of an individual’s learning and development and should be an ongoing process rather than a singular event. Training evaluation is important as it ensures that the intended outcomes from the training were achieved and that they offer a sound return on investment. In order to evaluate a training programme, a well-established method by Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2006) suggests four progressive steps of evaluation: Reaction, learning, behaviour, and results. The first stage is concerned with trainees’ reactions to the training programme, i.e. whether they liked it or not, whether they thought it was relevant for their jobs or not, whether they think it allows them to perform better or not, etc. The trainees’ reactions can be measured easily by means of questionnaires. The learning stage answers the question of if and what the trainees actually learnt. Traditionally, the amount of accumulated knowledge and skill is being measured by some form of final exam. This can either be a written or oral exam in a classroom, or a practical exam where the trainee’s behaviour is rated and observed by an inspector (for examples of evaluations of CBT for improving x-ray image recognition skills see Bolfing et al., 2008; Koller et al, 2008; Michel et al. 2008; Schwaninger et al. 2007). The behaviour stage deals with the question of whether the newly acquired knowledge is being transferred into the trainee’s daily work or not. For this purpose, various methods of observational, interviewing and operational performance measuring techniques can be used to assess a trainee’s performance on the job. This allows deriving the impact of the training programme when comparing the current performance with the previous performance data from the time before the training programme. The results stage asks whether the training programme was economically beneficial or not. After all, there is no sense in introducing a new training programme on a wide scale if the cost is too high in relation to the additional benefit it provides. The challenge here is to find the key performance indicators (KPI) that validly represent the trainees’ performance. Judging people by using bad KPIs is ethically questionable, unfair, and decreases the trainees’ motivation, as they might feel that no matter how hard they try, they have no influence on the result.

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This information is collected, collated and analysed in “fusion centres”. Created after the 9/11 attacks, fusion centres have been defined as “…a collaborative effort of two or more federal, state, local or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximising the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”[1]  By September 2006, there were 38 such centres; by February 2008, 58, by November 2010, 72.  At the present time, there are fusion centres in every state, and 22 more in major urban centres[2].

This article will examine some of ways that data and the centres themselves have been utilised in the context of civil aviation security.

The lure of data, to paraphrase an old song, has a very strong appeal. The computer-assisted passenger profile system (CAPPS), developed by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration is a case in point. Underlying the programme was the assumption that people meeting certain criteria would be subject to enhanced screening. The information existed in the form of data resident in government and airline computer systems. In 2003, the Transportation Security Administration proposed an expanded version of this programme, named CAPPS II. CAPPS II would rely on airline computer databases to identify people attempting to board aircraft who met specific criteria.  It also sought to expand these databases to include extra fields, e.g., a full street address, date of birth, and a home telephone number. Data would then be cross-referenced with government records and private sector databases to ascertain the identity of the person, and other details about that person. Risk scores would then be calculated and printed (in code) on the passenger’s boarding pass.  The code would dictate the level of screening given to the individual.

CAPPS II came under fire from various watchdog organisations and other federal agencies.  In February 2004 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) wrote a report critical of the TSA’s implementing plan and reiterating privacy concerns first voiced by members of Congress.[3]  As a result, CAPPS II was terminated shortly thereafter.  It was replaced, however, by a similar programme called “Secure Flight”.[4]

Despite the demise of CAPPS, the call for more data as a tool to combat terrorism continues.  At their recent annual meeting, the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) produced a White Paper, “Meeting Today’s Aviation Security Needs, A Call to Action for a Trust-Based Security System.”  In the Paper, ALPA calls for a “…proactive and adaptive…approach in order to…maintain an advantage over terrorists in order to meet this ever-changing threat.”  Rather than concentrating on the historical “…interdiction of threat objects…” ALPA calls for a paradigm shift.  The proposed system would “…positively identify known, trustworthy passengers…and concentrate our finite high-technology and behavioural screening resources on the small percentage of passengers whose trustworthiness is unknown or in doubt.”[5]  This end is achieved by determining a passenger’s trustworthiness “…to the greatest practical extent before being given a seat on an airliner.”[6]   Cutting to the chase, the Paper makes the point that “In our data-rich society, there is so much publicly available information about every citizen that a basic determination of trustworthiness is readily achievable.”[7] Thus, the default to data.

As the TSA discovered during the rush to implement CAPPS II and other agencies have found to their chagrin, data mining as a means to counter terrorist groups and operations is a slippery slope.[8]  Without examining the efficacy of data mining per se as a means to combat terrorism (a separate, albeit valid issue), advances in processing and utilisation of personal data has raised issues involving civil liberties.  Reports discussing the challenges inherent in data-mining and fusion centres have been generated by organisations ranging from the American Civil Liberties Union[9] and the Congressional Research Service (CRS)[10] to the GAO.[11]

In addition to concerns over civil liberties, fusion centres have been criticised for operating in an atmosphere of excessive secrecy, which only serves to heighten suspicions regarding their methods and mission.  The so-called ‘no-fly list’ is a case in point.

Some of the challenges inherent in fusion of data have ramifications for air travellers.  Almost two years ago, this writer chronicled the story of Mrs. Glenda Hutton, a 66-year-old retired Canadian schoolteacher who found herself on a no-fly list.  Two years, two thousand dollars and a television appearance later, Mrs. Hutton was able to fly again.  She was never told why, or how, her name appeared on such a list.  The continued growth of fusion centres, given their lack of accountability and transparency, make this a scenario more and more likely to be repeated.  The call for more data and a commensurate growth in computer engines to control the data flow is indicative of tandem trends: First, the increasing use of data, analysis and fusion to reveal trends and suspect behaviour. Second, an over-arching assumption on the part of the fusion centre user that this process will result in deliverables that a discrete beneficiary can utilise to a comprehensible advantage. Questions over underlying philosophy have been examined in reports critical of the mission of fusion centres, to include the CRS.[12]

The use of data mining engines and fusion centres to help identify and combat risks from terrorism, criminal activity and even natural hazards is increasing. Techniques to manage data flow, “fuse” and compare information from various sources are becoming more sophisticated. As the ALPA White Paper demonstrates, a strong bias exists among some organisations towards increasing fusion centre data applications to strengthen security processes.  This is especially true in the area of civil aviation security, where such techniques have been utilised for years.  CAPPS I & II, Secure Flight and other data collection efforts have been, and continue to be viewed as effective means by which passenger data can be collected, processed and analysed.

As panellists from one roundtable examining the issue of fusion centres and information control noted, “…the horse is out of the barn.”[13]  If this is indeed the case, the no-fly list can only grow, along with other ‘lists’ within which suspect persons might reside.  The example de jure is the TSA’s Trusted Traveller Programme.  The programme is described in a CNN article:

The idea is that if the TSA can gather enough information about someone to show that he is a reduced risk to security, then they can have a reduced level of physical security at the checkpoint itself. So, if you as a traveller want to give a lot of personal information, there is now hope that you can leave your shoes on and keep your laptop in your bag.[14]

At this point, the programme is under construction and open to only a few; primarily frequent fliers and people who currently utilise existing Customs and Border Protection (CBP) programmes to expedite entry into the United States.  Should it succeed (and it is difficult to see how it would not – who doesn’t want faster passage through the security screening checkpoint?), it has the potential to grow to include all travellers.  At that point, data matters.  Despite the voluntariness of the programme in its present form, the data must undergo verification.  And this presupposes a system by which one’s information is vetted through a database.

CAPPS, Watch Lists, Trust-based systems, Trusted Traveller – as the national security paradigm moves continually towards data collection and analysis and as data manipulation becomes more facile, programmes such as these will proliferate.  And many of them will exist within the ambit of civil aviation security.  The challenge is not merely to improve the security product, but to demonstrate a commensurate concern for its use.

One of the most vexing situations that airport managers can find themselves in is when a security threat or actual terrorism incident forces a decision to shut down the airport, close sections of it or try to maintain operations despite disruptions; all this while simultaneously trying to manage the emergency. The worst case would be a complete shut down, and as every company director knows, bottom line survival depends on keeping production and services going.

What is surprising is that while applied research is being accomplished in the area of business and organisational continuity, little spill over of the generic results has flowed into the area of maintaining airport continuity. Until now, such research has primarily focused on “plans” and “do lists” with little empirical evidence to show that such plans and lists actually enhance the ability of organisations undergoing a crisis to both survive and recover.

Most would think of a terrorist inside the airport or someone hijacking an aircraft as the prime cause for disruption. But, as with other service oriented organisations, airports are extremely sensitive to both internal and external disruptions. For example, disruption in the supply chain for fuel, electric power, replacement parts, ground transportation or food for catering would also have grave consequences for maintaining operations.

Organisational Continuity 

To shed light on what airport managers should keep in mind when thinking about maintaining operations despite emergencies, we would like to refer to a recent large scale research project on organisational continuity performed in Israel. While the study did not specifically focus on airports, it did examine the performance behaviour of employees and managers during and after incessant and actual threats against their work place. The objective was to understand who played key roles in helping maintain work place continuity and what social organisational processes supported organisational survival and recovery.

The study in Israel[1] was based on interview and questionnaire data of a sample of 420 employees and managers of 24 organisations that were under bombardment for over a month. The organisations examined included private and public manufacturing and service providers of various sizes, all located in areas which put them at extreme risk.  Importantly, what was measured were the overall performance levels of the organisations before, during and after the attack.  What appeared was that the initial sharp decline in output was quickly made up by the time the emergency was over. This was a clear indication that something happened during the interim that fostered recovery.

From the analysis of the data, the findings clearly demonstrate that innovative behaviour of managers and employees in organisations during a crisis was critical in determining the level of production and service maintenance and operational continuity. The weight of the evidence pointed toward the employees as the main contributors as they, unlike the managers, were closer to the actual situation and adapted their behaviour accordingly. For example, employees activated informal social networks through friends and acquaintances to make sure alternative sources of supplies (and manpower) were available; they arranged for shifts to be reorganised along with car pools; families’ safety needs were provided for and direct lines of communications were set up between management and workers to facilitate making quick decisions.  Managers, on the other hand, were constrained by administrative regulations, had a less clear picture of the effects of the disruption and were less adaptive in their decision making capacities.

Managers vs. Employees 

In addition, it was found that the response for both managers and employees to an emergency emerged from within a social (and not bureaucratic) framework that was characterised by innovative behavioural adaptation to changing and threatening conditions. The adaptive behaviour that emergency situations evoke, makes evident that the normal routine – while valuable in providing guidelines – will have difficulty in facing up to the realities of an emergency. Interestingly enough, the most important determinants included levels of emergent and pro-social behaviours and social network densities. In simpler terms, this meant that social interaction between and among the employees increased to such an extent that leaders emerged naturally rather than by official sanction; helping and assisting your colleagues became the norm and social network links to other employees outside your usual framework extended dramatically.

At this point let us take these results and mesh them with additional empirical evidence concerning the social basis of security decision making behaviour of employees in airports.

Innovative Security Decisions

An ongoing EU project found some astonishing results in ethnographic, interview and survey data that was collected across European airports, aimed at providing a behavioural science model of airport security.[2]   It was found that a large proportion of security employees will bend or even break the rules when the situation calls for it! It was also clear that during emergencies, when an airport is under actual threat of disruption, there is likely to be a modification (and even disregard) for the routine rules and procedures in favour of innovative and pro-social behaviours. Apparently this type of behaviour is very similar to the Israeli case where managers and especially employees generated actions to maintain continuity of operations. But where does this type of innovative and pro-social behaviour, that so much favours continuity, emerge from in an organisational structure that is built around keeping rules and regulations?

Potential Solutions 

We can only conclude that to maintain airport operations during an emergency requires that resources should be allocated to invest in training employees to act outside the normal administrative structure as well as a system of rewards to encourage taking responsibility and initiative. This will prevent precious loss of “down time” and set in motion continuity behaviours.

Training employees should go hand-in-hand with a similar briefing for managers of the best way to circumvent the usual administrative-bureaucratic system for issuing directives. In this way employees will be able to update managers in real time and thus avoid a misreading of the situation.

What the evidence also suggests is that even in times of normal security concerns, both employees and managers should always have up their sleeves a repertoire of alternative behaviours that go beyond the usual rules and procedures to be able to tackle the “unexpected”.

These recommendations reflect only a small part of the ‘evidence based’ results that can be implemented within airport organisational structures that will substantially increase the ability to not only survive a major disruption, but the tools to allow both employees and managers to maintain continuity of operations and, if necessary, speed up recovery.

Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum is Professor of Organisational Sociology at the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology and Initiator and Coordinator at BEMOSA (Behaviour Modelling for Security in Airports), a European-wide research project. Carmit Rapaport is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Universtiy of Haifa.  Sharon Lubazs is a PhD Candidate and Senior Researcher at the Tachnion – Israel Institute of Technology

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Philip Baum - Editor In Chief

I certainly ruffled a few feathers. In my last lead editorial, entitled “Christian Fundamentalism & Justiciar Knights”, I used the atrocity perpetrated in Norway on 22^nd July 2011 as an example of the fact that our security system must be able to counter the threat posed by all those who wish to target it, regardless as to their gender, colour, ethnicity or religion.

Albeit the article focussed on the actions of Anders Behring Breivik, I was careful to cite a Europol Report that stated that “…only 3 out of the 249 terrorist attacks that were perpetrated within the EU in 2010 were carried out by Islamists”. Judging by the response, however, it would seem many readers took offence at either the use of the phrase “Christian Fundamentalism” or the analysis of an attack that had been perpetrated against a non-aviation target. In analysing the responses, however, it was interesting to note that, without exception, every negative comment was expressed by an American.

I decided not to respond to people individually, especially as many missive senders had felt the need to express their sentiments with venom and in terms unbecoming of industry professionals. The lead editorial is supposed to be provocative in nature and to encourage debate, but I have little time for expletive-laden correspondence and am concerned when it is drafted by industry insiders. Despite that, I think there is a need to address the issue.

Many of those who wrote in were somehow of the impression that I was against profiling and felt the need to remind me that, “Israel effectively uses racial profiling in her airports to the benefit of its travellers”. Obviously the reader is unfamiliar with the fact that I never miss an opportunity (even now) to remind people of the value of profiling! He also stated that, “It works so well that the American TSA is finally being trained to use it as well”. Clearly the TSA has to better market its behavioural analysis programme if industry employees are of the belief that it is utilising racial profiling as part of its armoury.

The question though is whether we should profile on the basis of ethnicity and this is where I disagree. The same reader is of the view that due to the higher number of Islamist extremists than Christian extremists, ethnic profiling is justified. “Please tell me how many times you have heard Christian leaders, of any form, in any country, publicly embrace or preach the wilful murder of innocents and the overthrow of governments?….The active proponents of Islam, however, are legion in their preaching of hatred, murder, forced conversion or death, destruction and overthrow of western society in favour of Islamic rule.” He adds that, “In a religion of hundreds of millions of adherents there need be only a small percentage that embrace such views, but that small percentage still equates to millions.”

Another reader felt that I was trying to be politically correct – something I have always rallied against – and that, “If the point of the story is to say that not ALL terrorists are Islamic, then that was lost in the rush to cuddle up to the Islamic terrorist and label this psycho a ‘fundamentalist Christian’. The Christian Bible, fundamentally, states that all men are created in the image of God, therefore, any ‘fundamentalist Christian’ would not act in such a manner.” Still more extreme was the comment that, “Aviation security does not need politically correct excrement like this article. That heinous lunatic was about as Christian as Joseph Stalin”. I think it fair to point out that the vast majority of Muslims consider Mohammed Atta to be about as good a Muslim as Jesus…

In fact, it is that blinkered view of the world that could be our biggest enemy. I clearly recall the days before 11^th September 2001 when the American establishment justified the more intense security measures on flights operating to the United States than for those departing from, or operating within, the country on the basis of a misguided belief that all those who might wish to target aviation somehow lived overseas.

Another reader also took offence at my linking the phrase Christian Fundamentalism with a terrorist attack. “Christian Fundamentalism is a good thing: believe in Christ (God incarnate) to be saved from hell, do unto others as you would have them do unto you, love your neighbour as yourself, and finding peace.”  Anders Behring Breivik seemingly didn’t follow this line of thought….and one reader certainly feels that “It was unconscionable what this person did, but even worse is that this person will not be put to death for what he has done.” This brings us to the question as to whether I should have used a non-aviation story to illustrate a point.

I firmly believe that if we operate in a silo and fail to heed the bigger picture, all our frontline efforts are in vain. The type of attack that occurred in Norway could just as easily have been levelled at an airport. Let’s not forget that the first attempt to destroy the World Trade Centre in New York was with an improvised explosive device and the best example of liquid explosives being used to kill large numbers of people is Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995.

One reader pointed out that my editorial referred to the existence of “at least seven other ‘Justiciar Knights’ of his ilk” and commented “that may seem like a lot and, if they perform similar horrific acts as Breivik did, then it’s beyond regrettable. Yet it took only about that many Islamic terrorists to kill thousands in coordinated attacks on 9/11”. That’s exactly my point, as I do not question the fact that the greatest threat that we face is in the form of Islamic Fundamentalism. It clearly is. However, our security system must be one that addresses all threats and we need to go out of our way to ensure that our screeners do not become so fixated on one threat that they remain blind to the others which are also out there….as it only takes one Breivik…or, if you prefer 21^st Century aviation examples, one Zhang Pilin or one David Mark Robinson. And if you don’t know who they are, that further illustrates the problem we face!

Timings

8.46    The time that American Airlines flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre

9.03    The time that United Airlines flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Centre

9.37    The time that American Airlines flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon

9.58    The time the South Tower of the World Trade Centre collapsed

10.03  The time that United Airlines flight 93 crashed in Shanksville

10.28  The time the North Tower of the World Trade Centre collapsed

Deaths

23      New York City Police Department

37      Port Authority Police Department

40      United Airlines flight 93 (excluding hijackers)

59      American Airlines flight 77 (excluding hijackers)

60      United Airlines flight 175 (excluding hijackers)

87      American Airlines flight 11 (excluding hijackers)

115     Number of countries which lost citizens

125     Pentagon

200     Estimated (by USA Today) number of people who jumped to their deaths from the WTC

292     Estimated deaths at street level in New York caused by falling debris and people who jumped

343     New York City Fire Department

373     Foreign nationals

658     Cantor Fitzgerald employees

2606   World Trade Centre total casualties

2996   Official death toll, including hijackers

Hijackers

4        Hijackers who failed to reach their intended targets

15      Hijackers of Saudi nationality

15      Hijackers reached their intended targets

19      Total number

The Living

17      Number of babies subsequently born to women whose husbands died

1300   Number of orphans (according to The Guardian) created by the attacks

1609   Number of people widowed

3051   Number of children who lost a parent

The Cost (according to the Institute for Analysis of Global Security)

$385 million                       The loss of four civilian aircraft
up to $1 billion                  The damage to the Pentagon

$1.3 billion                        Cleanup costs
$3 billion to $4.5 billion       The destruction of major buildings at the World Trade Centre

$10 billion                         Loss of air traffic revenue

$10 billion to $13 billion       Property and infrastructure damage

$17 billion                         In lost wages

$21.8 billion                      Damaged or unrecoverable property

$40 billion                         Losses to the insurance industry

$40 billion                         Federal emergency funds (heightened airport security, sky marshals, government takeover of airport security, retrofitting aircraft with anti-terrorist devices, cost of operations in Afghanistan)

$95 billion                         Losses to the city of New York (lost jobs, lost taxes, damage to infrastructure, cleaning)