Almost everyone involved with air transport welcomes forecasts of the industry’s growth, such as the United States Federal Aviation Administration’s prediction that passenger volumes will double by 2032, and IATA’s that global passenger numbers will increase from 2.8 billion in 2011 to 3.6 billion in 2016. For those responsible for aviation security, however, the welcome news is accompanied by real concern that passenger pre-board screening checkpoints, already operating near full capacity in most airports, might be overwhelmed.  Solutions to the impending problems are essential.

A partial solution to the problem of over-crowding, which the United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has begun to implement, lies in applying risk-based security at the checkpoints. Its first premise is that the incidence of terrorists among airline passengers in the US is one in billions, or one occurrence in many years, and the vast majority of passengers, year in and year out, have no destructive intentions toward the flights they will board. It follows that if passengers can be reliably categorised as trusted travellers (in the US as “preCheck” passengers), their screening can be much less intensive and time consuming.  High throughput in trusted traveller checkpoint lanes is thereby obtained with almost zero increase in risk to flights; indeed the TSA contends that the innovation will reduce overall risk by permitting screening staff in other lanes to give more attention to a reduced number of  relatively risky, relatively unknown passengers. The benefits however depend on there being a high proportion of trusted travellers and on the reliability of their categorisation.

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Aviation security is at a turning point. More and more governments, companies and institutions are aware that the current way in which security is dealt with is unsustainable. The move to a risk-based approach seems to be the way forward as, if we keep the current one-size-fits-all approach, the whole system will come to a complete standstill. Given that it is anticipated that, worldwide, the number of passengers taking to the skies will double over the coming decade, if we keep on screening everybody to the same level, the waiting lines will explode. So the question is how we relieve the burden on the security chain whilst at least maintaining, if not improving upon, the existing level of security? Does everybody get the same level of screening? Should the Head of Aviation Security for a state be treated the same as an unknown passenger travelling with a one-way ticket without any checked baggage?

In this personal view I want to focus on an issue that could improve productivity in many countries regarding security. I want to highlight the importance of cooperation. Too many entities are doing their work and their intelligence gathering on their own, thereby limiting the effectiveness of a risk-based security system. If there were better synergy between governments, as well as between states and stakeholders, better solutions could be found. In Europe, the European Commission is interacting regularly on security regulation with stakeholders in the Stakeholder Advisory Group on Aviation Security (SAGAS). Here, all relevant information, threats and proposed legislation is shared and discussed with stakeholders, who can, in return, give input to the Member States as to how the proposed legislation will impact the industry. Of course not all information can be shared with stakeholders, as some is clearly security sensitive; however the quantity of such information is limited and should not prevent discourse on what can be shared. Also within the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), stakeholder input is seen as very important. The European Cockpit Association, which I represent, is a member of the SAGAS as well as most of the working groups of ECAC.

Nico Voorbach is President, European Cockpit Association

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This incident is a stark reminder to airports around the world that whilst major incidents are rare, they do happen, and when they do airports need to be well prepared to act at that decisive moment. Of course, I cannot comment on the specific systems, infrastructure and processes that are in place in Brussels (although it was reported that in 2001 it pioneered IP video by installing what was then the largest system in Europe), but airports in general have been some of the early adopters of the very latest safety and security technologies (especially since 9/11). They have invested millions in state-of-the-art communications, IP-based surveillance cameras, alarms and detectors, video analytics, access control, biometrics, intrusion detection and ANPR etc.

All of these systems, alongside the teams on the ground, in the control room and those working in the emergency services, are vital to protecting the infrastructure and people in and around the airport. However, the turn of events at Brussels is a timely reminder to all involved in the safety, security and broader operations at airports large and small around the world, to look at the systems and processes which are in place and ask if such a situation occurred now, how well equipped would they be to react?

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It’s 4a.m Sunday morning and the telephone rings. My wife answers and duly informs me that she has a drunk on the line. Three similar calls are received within the space of ten minutes. Eventually we establish that the mysterious caller is the Alarm Centre! Apparently they’ve just received a message from our security system telling them that someone is trying to sabotage our front door. Turned out to be a fault in the system, but who knows what my wife might have found when I sent her downstairs to check it out!

And if that’s not enough, airliners are reporting cracks in the wings, batteries exploding, leaking fuel and engines blowing up. In fact not a day goes by without us receiving security warnings, and we respond appropriately. Of course not all make sense, so for example a nasal spray at airport security is a WMD if it’s not in a plastic bag – place it in the bag and it’s instantly neutralised! But in general we tend to adopt a common sense approach, with one glaring omission.

Seems like IT security is a joke…

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The act of stowing away in the landing gear compartment of a large passenger aircraft is highly dangerous; not only for the stowaway, but also for the aviation industry. Andrew Gilbey reviews some recent reports of stowaways and their implications for the aviation industry, followed by a brief evaluation of some of the technological applications that may help to secure the vulnerability that stowaways expose. When they occur, the news media are usually quick to report stories about stowaways; particularly those who have fallen from aircraft and whose bodies have landed in residential areas beneath the flight paths of airports. Many reading such stories must wonder what could possibly drive a person to attempt such a desperate measure as to stowaway in this manner.

The term ‘stowaway’ generally refers to a person who hides aboard a means of transport, such as aircraft, ship or heavy goods vehicle, with the intention of travelling without paying; although it may also refer to species such as spiders, snakes, and mosquitoes, or even viruses such as measles. Analysts believe that many human stowaways are illegal immigrants desperate to seek what they perceive as a better life in another country; in particular, people for whom a legal means of emigrating may be unviable on financial or educational grounds or immigration quotas.

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At the 21st IATA AVSEC World, which took place in New York City at the beginning of March this year, both Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and John Pistole, Administrator of the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA), highlighted the importance of the US’ Trusted Traveller Programs to the future of aviation security.  Secretary Napolitano set out the Department’s vision to drive the adoption of these programmes up to 25% (1 in 4), up from the current 8% (1 in 12), over the course of the next 2-3 years.  Ultimately, the goal is to ensure that the next era will expand and accelerate the global movement towards an intelligence-driven, risk-based approach to security, using identity management and key passenger information to make the best possible use of advancing technologies to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of limited resources.

If government and industry are to successfully collaborate and deliver this vision, it will be vital to understand the critically important role Machine-Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs) will play in establishing and verifying the identities of the millions of passengers who travel through airports and cross international borders every single day of the year.

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The air waybill (AWB) is the contract of carriage between the carrier and the shipper, where the freight forwarder very often acts as shipper. The electronic AWB (e-AWB) is an electronic equivalent to the paper AWB that has been used by the industry for many years. IATA and its airline members are committed to implementing e-AWB as the first step towards the e-freight vision, with the target to achieve 100% e-AWB penetration by the end of 2015.

FIATA, the International Federation of Freight Forwarder Associations, supports the introduction of the e-AWB and encourages its members to switch from paper to e-AWB as soon as feasible. In 2012, the Global Air Cargo Advisory Group (GACAG), which includes representatives of most of the end-to-end air cargo stakeholders, developed a roadmap to 100% e-freight. This roadmap defines the approach, structure and targets for the e-freight programme moving forward and includes the move to 100% e-AWB by end 2015.

Why the AWB is Important for Security?

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Attacks with CBRN agents have a low probability but, should they occur, potentially enormous impact. When a terrorist uses an automatic weapon or an explosive device, he creates a hazard with a bang – a clear and immediate danger. For CBRN this is different as the real danger only comes into play after the bang…if there is a bang at all. Releasing a chemical or biological agent can easily go unnoticed. However, the consequences of such a release will not go unnoticed and the agent can show its lethality days or weeks after the attack was perpetrated.

Whilst terrorism is, in essence, political violence, CBRN agents are the ultimate political weapons. The fear and societal impact of merely the threat of a CBRN incident can have a larger impact than an actual attack utilising traditional explosives. Besides the societal impact, the practical consequences of an attack can also be long-lasting. Contamination with CBRN agents can make an area unusable and uninhabitable for years. This was the case with the buildings, postal offices and Senate in the United States, that were contaminated with Anthrax in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. It took years and cost over one billion dollars to decontaminate the sites.

What do CBRN Weapons Look Like?

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Industry personnel, including flight attendants, pilots, TSA officers, Federal Air Marshals, and airline management, as well as a large bipartisan contingent of lawmakers, have voiced huge concern at the change in policy with regards to certain products currently on the Prohibited Items List and have demanded that this new policy not go into effect. The Association of Professional Flight Attendants (APFA) represents 16,000 employees at American Airlines, many of whom lost close friends and all of whom lost colleagues on 9/11, and has been among the leading voices against this dangerous decision.

The 9/11 Commission Report

The official report of the events leading up to the attacks of 11 September 2001, details, to the extent possible, the tactics employed by the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks.

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Over ten years ago I was taught how to be a crisis negotiator. The image most people have of negotiators is of them dealing with terrorists or criminals trapped in a bank. However, the vast majority of people who encounter one, in London at least, are those who wish to commit suicide. The skills needed to deal with someone in such a crisis, one in which they wish to find a permanent solution to what is probably a temporary problem, are key to saving lives. Whilst it may seem extreme to argue that those skills are relevant to dealing with a non-compliant passenger, I hope to demonstrate that they are. In many ways the experiences I have had negotiating with terrorists and criminals were easier conversations and negotiations. I am sure that some airline staff would agree that dealing with irate or drunk passengers can be some of the most stressful situations they have been in. The following skills will help: planning and preparation, context manipulation, first impressions, listening skills and influence and persuasion skills.

Planning and Preparation
Spending some time considering the types of situations aircrew may find themselves in, I am sure results in a long list of ‘types’ of people and situations. These may include the slightly nervous distracted passenger, the impatient business traveller and the angry aggressive drunk wanting to fight you or fellow passengers in order to be served more alcohol. The list may extend to a person suffering mental health issues, or a ‘terrorist’ attacking you in order to take control of the aircraft. If we spend a few moments thinking about what may motivate each person to behave in the way they do, we may arrive at a short list of motivations, although a long list of events that may have resulted in the action they are now taking. In short, we are motivated for reasons of affiliation, status and control. However, how we behave may be the result of many events.  During one suicide intervention, when asking the person why he was considering suicide, he stated, “I stubbed my toe this morning and lost my car keys”. During the next five hours he disclosed the loss of a child, breakdown of a marriage and financial ruin – in short the keys and toe were the final straw.  In terms of terrorism, many debate whether ‘terrorists’ are mad or bad – yet most academics would argue that terrorism is, in the main, undertaken by rational people, albeit undertaking extraordinary behaviour.

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