Counter Terror Gazette

Personal View expressed by Andy Blackwell

26 Aug 2011

As I am preparing this viewpoint, the tenth anniversary of 11^th September 2001 is fast approaching. Like many who witnessed the attacks, I can vividly recall the tragic events that occurred on that day, and my thoughts are with the families and friends who lost their loved ones. Ten years on and the desire of terrorists to target civil aviation remains strong, with concerns being aired publicly about the possibility of terrorists using surgically implanted improvised explosive devices.

In an effort to create a climate of fear, terrorist organisations make extensive use of the internet for propaganda purposes. As their web presence increases, so does the likelihood of further attack methods being published. Clearly we don’t ‘own’ the threats, but we do have to assess them and manage any emerging risks. Not every threat will emerge as a risk though, as a threat only becomes a risk based on the probability of the event occurring and the potential consequences. Obviously, the capability and intent of the adversary need to be taken into account during the assessment process.

Threats to the industry are dynamic and can result in new risks emerging in what is often described as a ‘cat and mouse’ game between those intent on causing harm, and those seeking to stop them. The dynamic nature of such threats to the industry is likely to drive aviation security to a more outcome-focused risk-based approach as regulation finds it difficult to keep up, and ‘one size’ invariably doesn’t fit all.

Whilst it’s easy to be critical of regulators and security regimes, it’s important to acknowledge that much progress has been made and continues to be made. The industry remains committed to ensuring the integrity of aviation security by working with key stakeholders and genuinely making a positive difference. Hindsight is a wonderful thing and following any major security incident it’s important we base our responses on facts, not emotion or politics. Unfortunately, there are no ‘silver bullets’ and the innovation demonstrated by terrorist planners makes it vital for aviation security measures to remain flexible, robust and proportionate. Unpredictability is key.

As we remember those who were so tragically lost and injured in the 11^th September 2001 attacks, it’s important to look at the positive differences that have been made in the ten years following the events that unfolded that day.  In my view, intelligence sharing has improved and a more holistic approach to aviation security is being taken by key stakeholders. There is greater collaboration between regulators and industry, and signs that aviation security is becoming less reactive and more pro-active.  The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has been working on the Checkpoint of the Future, designed to enhance security whilst reducing queues and intrusive searches at airports, using intelligence-driven, risk-based measures. Airports Council International (ACI) has been involved in initiatives to promote ‘next generation’ security screening and checkpoint measures, and the US Transport Security Administration has widely publicised their ongoing efforts to implement risk-based, intelligence-driven security measures.

Outcome-focused risk-based security regulation (OFRB) is being discussed, and if progressed would move from prescribing security processes to setting security outcomes. It is believed that OFRB regulation would give airports and airlines greater flexibility to deliver high standards of security in ways that are better integrated with their day-to-day business and which, in time, could lead to a better customer experience. Legislative changes would be needed to make such regimes viable, and the UK Department for Transport has issued a consultation document on the subject. The proposed OFRB approach to aviation security regulation would build on the successful and similar stance that has been taken with aviation safety.

In relation to detection, it is now widely acknowledged that the focus must be on detecting the bomber, not just the bomb. Whilst technology has a significant role to play in detecting threat items, the increasing use of staff trained in behavioural detection is helping to manage non-conventional risks.

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