The Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques Programme: analysing the issues

14 Jun 2011

The Transportation Security Administration implemented the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) programme in selected United States airports from 2003 as a counterterrorism strategy. Melissa Perry and Andrew Gilbey consider some of the issues underpinning the programme given that it has, according to a Government Accountability Office(GAO)  report, failed to catch a single terrorist and, despite substantial investment, may have achieved nothing in terms of aviation security gains.

The ability to identify people whose aim is to threaten aviation security before they actually strike, by simply observing their behaviour, would offer a significant breakthrough in aviation security. Whilst this idea may sound like it has been borrowed from George Orwell’s novel 1984, it is in fact a real programme now in operation at 161 US airports.

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) developed and implemented the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) programme following the 9/11 attacks as an airport-based counterterrorism strategy aimed at deterring and preventing terrorists from boarding commercial aircraft and causing harm (GAO, 2010). The SPOT programme is designed to identify potentially high security risk individuals by screening travellers for behaviours that may be indicative of stress, fear or deception (GAO, 2010; Karp, 2010). Behaviour Detection Officers (BDO), who are responsible for implementing SPOT, utilise non-intrusive behaviour observation, analysis and detection techniques to screen travellers for involuntary behavioural reactions exhibited in response to the fear of being discovered (TSA, 2006; TSA, 2010).

Does it Work?

Whilst in principle SPOT may offer a breakthrough in the way aviation security works, in practice there is little evidence of either its effectiveness or efficacy. Despite deploying approximately 3,000 BDOs at a cost of about $212 million annually, the Transportation Security Administration’s SPOT programme has failed to detect a single terrorist (GAO, 2010). Although it is possible that the SPOT programme has fulfilled its mandate extremely well by deterring would-be terrorists, a deterrence argument is weakened by the fact that 16 individuals with terrorist involvement have travelled through 8 SPOT airports on 23 different occasions undetected by the Behaviour Detection Officers (GAO, 2010). We suggest that this apparent lack of effectiveness is not surprising given that there is little scientific evidence that humans can detect intent to deceive on the basis of nonverbal behaviour observation and analysis techniques.

Detection Accuracy

Whilst parents often appear to know whether young children are lying or hiding something, humans in general are not particularly good at detecting deception by observing behaviour. For example, on average, both laypersons and professional lie catchers perform only slightly better than average when attempting to detect the deception/truth of people unknown to them (Vrij, 2008). In other words, the simple flip of a coin may be almost as useful in detecting deception.

Behavioural Cues and Microexpression Detection

One aspect of SPOT training involves teaching BDOs how to detect microfacial expressions of emotion based upon Paul Ekman’s research on deception detection (GAO, 2010). Microfacial expressions are split-second emotional expressions on a person’s face that may reveal concealed emotion indicative of true feelings (Ekman, 2006; GAO, 2010).

Although the idea of micro-expressions has attracted much attention – they were argued to have been observed when Bill Clinton referred to ‘having not had relations with that woman’ – many researchers are dubious about the science upon which they are based. For example, independent researchers have been unable to replicate Ekman’s results on facial coding, suggesting that there is little support for the use of microexpression analysis as a terrorist detection tool (Weinberger, 2010). Most peer-reviewed research on microexpressions was published in the 1970s and 1980s and very little of Ekman’s later research on microexpressions has been peer-reviewed by other experts in the field. Without peer-review, it is difficult to assess the validity and reliability of Ekman’s research findings because it is not known if the information reported is accurate or erroneous.

Another criticism is that the majority of research on microexpressions is not relevant to the SPOT context because most of Ekman’s work has focused on the facial expressions that accompany spoken lies and not the microexpressions of deceptive individuals waiting in line at an airport security checkpoint.

There are other issues associated with the use of microexpression analysis as a terrorist detection tool. For instance, terrorists may be able to effectively suppress microexpressions with training (in the same way that many people can be trained to beat a polygraph test), some individuals may naturally exhibit microexpressions whereas others may not, and the frequency of occurrence of microexpressions is unknown. Similarly, microexpressions last a fraction of a second and may be undetected by BDOs. In fact, BDOs who blink at the moment a microexpression occurs will miss it and even if BDOs can detect split-second microexpressions it is not known how many travellers are showing suspicious microexpressions and are not being noticed. It may even be possible to suppress microexpressions with the use of the cosmetic enhancer, Botox.

There is no evidence that terrorists will exhibit the same specific behavioural response across all situations, or across all individuals, which calls into doubt the reliability of any observed indicators. It is also possible that terrorists may not display any behavioural indicators of stress, nervousness, fear, apprehension or guilt, due to their beliefs or moral disengagement from their intended actions. Furthermore, many behavioural cues may occur for reasons unrelated to deceptive intent (e.g., fear of flying or fear of crowds), thus innocent travellers may therefore show the same nervous behaviour as terrorists.

Individual and Cultural Differences

The BDO’s task of detecting truth/deception through observation may be further complicated by individual and cultural differences. Some individuals may characteristically exhibit deceptive behaviours regardless of whether they are actually being truthful or deceptive and other individuals are exceptionally good at deceiving as a result of inherent acting skills.

Associated with personality traits, the non-verbal behaviour of expressive individuals conveys an impression of truthfulness whereas the natural behaviour of self-conscious, introverted and socially anxious individuals leaves an impression of deception. As BDOs are not exposed to each traveller’s normal baseline behaviour, BDOs will be prone to making judgment errors. The use of SPOT indicators allows particular nonverbal behaviours to be interpreted as suspicious without determining whether these behaviours are a natural part of a traveller’s ordinary behaviour. The result is that terrorists with naturally expressive behaviours may remain undetected and travellers with naturally suspicious behaviours may be at risk of being falsely identified as a potential security threat.

Similarly, cultural differences can influence behaviour and thus detection accuracy. BDOs may be more accurate in detecting behaviours of travellers from their own cultural group and less accurate in detecting behaviours of travellers from more disparate cultural groups due to an in-group advantage. Behavioural differences between Western cultures and other traveller cultures raise the potential for cross-cultural non-verbal communication errors where non-verbal behaviours that are typical for an ethnic group/culture may be misinterpreted by American BDOs as suspicious or deceptive in situations where BDOs and travellers are from culturally dissimilar groups.

MORE ONLINE

5 Responses to “The Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques Programme: analysing the issues”

  1. Our efforts to introduce automation of the analysis of non-verbal behaviours has resulted in a system called Silent Talker, which uses artificial neural networks. Non-verbal signals hold rich information about mental, behavioural and physical states, that can be used to detect deception and truth. I suggest that airports consider this technology as an screening method to compliment the SPOT indicators, in order to increase sensitivity and specificity.

  2. The SPOT program has been repeatedly criticized for failing to apprehend these 16 _alleged_ terrorists (to my knowledge they are still only alleged to be such). However it strikes me as bizarre that anyone would think a terrorist displayed distinctive behaviour purely because they were a terrorist. If they were about to destroy the plane they were due to fly on then maybe they would display certain behaviour. Were a terrorist flying to visit his mother, though, there is no reason to think that he would act differently to any other person. And this is without touching the complex issue of defining a terrorist (presumably SPOT would also aim to prevent non-politically/religiously-motivated criminals intent on destruction from boarding planes).

    As such it seems that SPOT may be effective at apprehending terrorists about to destroy planes, but not terrorists per se. Despite the time and money poured into the program there is still no evidence that it either works or does not work in this more restricted capacity as a) no planes flying from SPOT-operating airports have been destroyed and b) no terrorists about to destroy a plane have been apprehended in a SPOT-operating airport.

    As to the deterrent effect of SPOT, this seems highly unlikely given the relative lack of awareness as to its imposition. Although this magazine is written for those involved in aviation security it assumes the reader has little or no knowledge of SPOT. If those involved in aviation security are largely unaware of the program then it seems reasonable to believe that terrorists are similarly unaware. If so then it would have little to no deterrent effect on terrorists.

    Overall it appears as if SPOT were at best oversold as a panacea to capturing terrorists boarding planes and at worst actually believed to be such by those responsible for its funding. This is hopelessly unrealistic. At this stage it might be more productive to re-examine its aims and to restate these as more modest but at the same time more realistic than those currently in place.

  3. Lawrence E CONWAY says:

    The TSA have held it neccessary to limit what should be revealed about their method, which has less to do with micro-expressions as Dr.EKMAN would like the world to believe. Statistically if more than 2 billion people travel by air per year, how many terrorists can you expect to find? With 3000 agents, who are not stationned at all times in front of every screening post your chances are very marginal. Have you asked who else might benefit from the method ? Besides I don’t remember reading about your 16 individual terrorists successfully exploding 23 airplanes. Have you asked the Isrealians, from which the US program originates, if they would like to go back to not interviewing their passengers before embarking? You will find a solid no for an answer.

    Myself, having worked on developping a European Behavior Observation technic was horrified to learn that the airport security agents were only trained in operating detection equipment and to strictly follow their obligated procedures. The agents principal objective was limited to just these two concerns. Nobody saw it fit to ask that they look up at and into the eyes of the passenger to see if they could present a potential risk to themselves, the other passengers or the flight itself. Person would have remarked anything, even if FRANKENSTIEN presented hisself for a flight.

  4. This is an interesting one. There is much to be gained through observation and that is enhanced by alert, adept and well-trained operatives; rendered useless by the opposite. Constrained application of observation either by regulation or simply an inability to do it properly are probably the main contributors to the lack of evidenced success. Comparative research is indeed crucial and the engagement route is perhaps one way – it may not be the right one and the process needs more expansive thought.

    If we consider the concept of layered defence then we can also use the concept of layered observation, screening and clearance to inform the way forward. Observation, technology, surveillance, engagement, tracking and constant research and realignment in response to the subject and threat format are possibly the optimal blend. As mentioned elsewhere, the checkpoint of the future in its current concept form not quite right. We at the University are looking at this in our research and study activities right now and indications so far is that there is another way…
    Posted by Phil Wood MBE MSc CPP PSP

  5. Observation alone has clear limitations ; hence , perhaps , the lack of supporting evidence ? Assessment by engagement however , may offer a more productive outcome . Paralinguistics ( Body Language ) is mearly an adjunct to an intereaction and not an exact ` diagnostic ` tool in isolation .

    Further comparative research ( in which Observation alone is compared with Assessment by Engagement ) may yeild evidence that will set aviation security on the path to a truely holistic outcome ?

Leave a Reply