Author: neilw

Leidos (NYSE:LDOS), a FORTUNE® 500 science and technology leader, today announced that it has completed the acquisition of L3Harris Technologies’ (“L3Harris”) Security Detection and Automation businesses, for approximately $1 billion in cash. The transaction was previously announced on Feb. 4, 2020.

The acquired businesses provide airport and critical infrastructure screening products, automated tray return systems and other industrial automation products. They will operate within the Leidos Civil Group, led by Jim Moos, Civil Group president. Combined with Leidos’ existing cargo and baggage screening product lines, Leidos now goes to market with a global security detection and automation footprint of more than 24,000 systems deployed in more than 120 countries. Leidos will continue to serve global customers in the aviation, transportation, government and critical infrastructure markets.

“In line with our mission of making the world safer, healthier and more efficient, this security detection and automation acquisition furthers our important work in the secure movement of people and commerce globally,” said Leidos Chairman and CEO Roger Krone. “We are excited to support critical infrastructure wherever it is needed, and to help transform the global security marketplace.”

“This deal expands our scope and scale in securing ports and borders, enhancing passenger movement in airports of the future, and fortifying infrastructure for national security and public venues,” said Moos. “We are pleased to welcome more than 1,200 L3Harris employees around the world to the Leidos team, who share our deep commitment of providing our customers with a fully-integrated security technology ecosystem.”

Compelling Strategic and Operational Benefits

Expands Product Portfolio in High-Growth, Global Security Market: The closing of this acquisition creates a comprehensive and cohesive security detection platform by adding technologies including checkpoint CT scanners, people scanners, explosives trace detectors, checked baggage screeners, and automated tray return systems (ATRS) to Leidos’ security detection portfolio. The combined solutions enhance the company’s offerings in an evolving global security product market, which allows diversification beyond the federal budget and positions the company for long-term growth.

Increased International Presence Diversifies Revenue: This business expands customer penetration across aviation, ports, borders, and critical infrastructure internationally and increases Leidos’ international security products revenue more than six-fold. The deal brings Leidos products into 75 additional countries.
Growth and Innovation Accelerated by Scale: The integration of these new businesses into a comprehensive portfolio enables Leidos to leverage its core technical strengths, in-depth biometrics capabilities, and global sales channels to rapidly develop and deliver new solutions. Technology investments across the combined portfolio will help accelerate innovation to address emerging and evolving threats and improve service efficiency for customers.
Transaction Details

The transaction is expected to be immediately accretive to Leidos’ revenue growth, EBITDA margins, and non-GAAP diluted earnings per share upon closing.

Cash consideration of approximately $1.0 billion plus related transaction costs was funded through a combination of excess cash on hand and a two-year term loan.

Most of us go about our daily lives oblivious of the security measures put in place to protect us and the society we live in. We know, or at least hope, that the security services are doing their utmost to take necessary steps to guard against the next terrorist atrocity. However, when we fly we witness and experience enhanced security measures which in some respects reassure us, yet also force us to consider the degree to which our personal privacy can be invaded in the process; these measures, after all, have a serious impact on issues of fundamental human rights and civil liberties, including the rights to privacy and data protection, freedom of movement, the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In January 2017, and in light of the Executive Orders signed by newly elected President Trump limiting the travel of certain people based on their nationality or country of birth, this has become an ever more taxing issue. Olga Enerstvedt questions whether it is possible to satisfy both aviation security requirements and passengers’ civil liberty rights, or whether there is a contradiction between them.

On the one hand, states have a duty to maintain a high level of security, to adopt measures protecting persons, aircraft, airport facilities and other assets from harm. On the other hand, there are various instruments aimed at protecting human rights, and states are obliged to promote, respect, protect and fulfil them.

Balancing or Proportionality Test?
A common suggestion is to find a balance between liberty and security values. In other words, we should use the so-called ‘trade-off model’. In short, it is not possible to place greater emphasis on one of the values without detracting from the other.

However, in balancing terms, civil liberties will always be compromised. It is obvious that security, which is vital to survival, is more important than, for example, privacy, which is a social and political need but is not an immediate matter of survival. Only when security needs are satisfied is it possible to consider needs relating to civil liberties at all.

The balancing concept is subject to criticism; firstly because it justifies the compromises to civil liberties. It is suggested that, instead, the test of proportionality should be used. By using the latter, one can evaluate whether a security measure is suitable, necessary, without any less intrusive alternatives, non-excessive, and so on. Applying these criteria allows us to assess whether the human rights risks caused by this measure are proportionate to its security benefits and other factors.

Civil Liberties Risks
Unfortunately, in an article, one cannot look into civil liberties issues in aviation security in depth. Nevertheless, using the results of my previous extensive research, the risks relating to a number of emerging but increasingly used technologies – body scanners, camera surveillance (CCTV) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems – can be summarised in the table (Table 1, facing page).

In brief, to different extents, all of the indicated measures interfere with privacy and raise concerns in respect of a number of data protection principles, such as fair and lawful processing, proportionality, purpose limitation, minimality, and data subject influence.

The right to freedom of movement may suffer as well, in particular with regard to PNR and smart CCTV, if innocent persons are mistakenly stopped, searched and detained, mainly as the result of mistaken inclusion on various watch lists, inaccuracy of facial recognition and behavioural analysis techniques.

All the measures raise concerns with respect to the right to non-discrimination. Body scanners may discriminate against ‘abnormal’ persons and may be used discriminatively if a person is selected by security officers to go through the device or automatically chosen due to specific characteristics. In the case of CCTV, some people are over-scrutinised by either human security staff or by automatic tools. The use of PNR may also involve the use of sensitive data and profiling, which is discriminative by nature.

With regard to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, all the measures can have a negative impact indirectly, mainly via religion as a criterion for discrimination. Additionally, if smart CCTV detects movements that are quite neutral but are linked to practising a specific faith, but which are deemed suspicious, this can discriminate and disproportionally affect the right to privacy of a specific group of persons.

The threat posed by so-called ‘foreign fighters’ has intensified over the last few years. Dr John Harrison attempts to place the complex issue in context and offer some ways in which the international civil aviation system can play a role in addressing the threat.

One of the defining characteristics of the al-Qa’eda (AQ) and Da’esh (the author will use the Arabic acronym for so-called Islamic State) has been the ability of both groups to attract, and train individuals globally to come and fight for their cause. Al-Qa’eda, for example, is thought by some to have processed as many as 100,000 people in its camps between 1996 and 2001, albeit the figure most likely stands between 10-20,000. Similarly, Da’esh has been able to attract foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq and, to a lesser degree, Libya. According to the United Nations 360,000 have entered Syria since 2011, and while around 30,000 remain, tens of thousands have either died or otherwise departed. Some, as demonstrated by the attacks in Europe since 2014, are returning to their home countries with their extremist ideology intact.

The Threat in Context
Since the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency in 2004, the concept of the foreign fighter has been gaining wider traction. Experts understand the term to mean individuals who leave their country of origin or residence to join a non-state armed group fighting abroad. The typical profile of a fighter is a male between 18 and 30 who is either ideologically motivated -(usually a radical and distorted understanding of Sunni Islam), looking for meaning in their lives, or simply seeking adventure. While many are paid better than local fighters, money does not seem to be their primary motivation, so they are not considered mercenaries.

The phenomenon is of course not new; 35,000 so-called ‘Afghan Arabs’ – Muslims from 43 different countries – fought against the Soviets during their invasion of Afghanistan. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) almost 60,000 foreigners fought, primarily for the Republicans. Perhaps most famously, Lord Byron and other English foreign fighters went off to fight in the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s. What defines the current wave of fighters – including those who participated in the Soviet War in Afghanistan – is that some have remained active combatants, travelling from the Balkans to Chechnya, to Algeria to Yemen throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, and are increasingly returning to their homeland and countries of residence.

The Two Foreign Fighter Threats
The international focus on the foreign fighter phenomenon has, understandably, fixated on those fighters aligned with Da’esh and other anti-Syria regime combatants (predominantly Sunni Muslims). As a consequence, a smaller but strategically important group has been overlooked: the pro-regime Shi’a fighters – the Syrian regime comes from the Alawites, a Shi’a group. Iran – a Shi’a majority state that backs the regime – has recruited 20,000 Afghan Shi’a, and an unknown number of Pakistani Shi’a to fight as part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces in Syria. Additionally, Iran has used its air force, the state carrier Iran Air, and private carriers Yas and Mahan Air to help move combatants. The latter two have been sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council for transporting equipment and personnel to fight for the Syria regime. The air route between Iran and Syria is the most critical supply corridor as the land routes through Iraq are currently controlled by Da’esh and Iran does not have sea-lift capabilities.

These Shi’a fighters are perhaps more of a strategic threat than Da’esh; when these trained and experienced fighters return to Afghanistan, or Pakistan, they may serve as a catalyst for further sectarian violence in these countries, which already face deepening sectarian divides. But unlike Da’esh, Iran will have a greater ability to direct and support and even control these groups to advance its strategic interests.

It is important to note that al-Qa’eda has not ceded the field to Da’esh. Not only is it now aligned to two other groups, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly known as Jabat al Nursa) and Ahrar al-Sham, but AQ has also sent a special unit, identified by the US as the Khorasan Group, to conduct mass casualty attacks in Europe including aviation targets. US airstrikes in Syria in September of 2014 are understood to have disrupted the group.

That said, the recent Da’esh-linked attacks in Paris, Brussels, Berlin and elsewhere have demonstrated that the threat posed by these fighters to the rest of the world, and the aviation industry in particular, is no longer theoretical.

by Philip Baum

When EgyptAir flight MS804 crashed on 19 May last year, whilst en route from Paris to Cairo, speculation was rife that the disaster had been caused by a terrorist bomb. After all, modern aeroplanes don’t just fall out of the sky and, considering that both Egypt and France were at the time, and continue to be, in the crosshairs of terrorist actions, it seemed to be the logical assumption. Yet, with an absence of proof, evidence of a fire on board (albeit cause unknown), and the French authorities keen for one of their gateway airports not to be the point of loading of the latest explosive charge, the security story was kept at bay.

At bay, that is, until just before Christmas. On 15th December, the Central Directorate of Aircraft Accident Investigation at the Egyptian Ministry of Civil Aviation received the forensic report relating to the victims’ remains; it finally confirmed that explosive residue had been found on the bodies of the victims of the disaster. “The Egyptian Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee has transferred the case to the Egyptian Prosecution Bureau for further investigation” and another passenger jet has seemingly succumbed to a terrorist act.

The news was not new. In September, Le Figaro had reported that bodies had been found to have traces of TNT on them, but this week’s announcement was the first official confirmation.

Aside from ISIS, the only entity that benefits from this latest development is Airbus; flying continues to be safe, if not secure, and the manufacturer of the jet was not at fault. For Egypt, desperately trying to resurrect its tourism industry in the aftermath of the October 2015 Metrojet bombing over the Sinai, and the subsequent cancellation of almost all European and Russian charter operations to Sharm el-Sheikh, the news could not be worse. The message, exacerbated by suicide bombing of the el-Botroseya Coptic church in Cairo on 11th December, which killed 25 people and injured dozens of others, and the 9th December bombing near the Pyramids in Giza, which killed seven people, simply illustrated that Egypt is a prime target for ISIS; the group has claimed responsibility for both the Metrojet and Botroseya church attacks as part of their “war against apostates”.

France has, perhaps, benefited from the delayed confirmation of the presence of explosive residue. The story has lost its momentum and, in any case, whilst the doomed flight did depart from Charles de Gaulle, there is absolutely no evidence that the bomb was loaded there; the aircraft had stopped at a number of other airports where the device could have been infiltrated on board. That said, it was as recently as December 2015 that 70 employees at the French capital’s airports had their security passes revoked in the aftermath of the November 2015 Paris attacks. A decade ago, another 72 Muslim male staff found themselves unable to continue in their employment at Charles de Gaulle airport as they were deemed, by the Anti-terrorist Co-ordination Unit (UCLAT), to represent a vulnerability or danger. The insider threat has, for some time, been deemed to be a real concern in France.

It is highly unlikely that any airlines are going to cease operations to Charles de Gaulle as a result of the loss of MS804, and no European government will put in place the sanctions they did against Egypt after the loss of the Metrojet flight. Such is the nature of international politics and economics. Whilst Egypt has been forced to clean up its act, and its economy suffered hugely as a result, the number of people going through Charles de Gaulle over the Christmas holiday period was similar to previous years.

But France, and other European states, face an even greater challenge than their Egyptian counterparts. Behind the scenes, there will be considerable pressure to aggressively address the insider threat. All staff will be treated with a degree of suspicion and, like it or not, it will be Muslim employees who will bear the brunt of the clamp down. Those who previously had their passes rescinded have claimed that they were questioned about their degree of religious observance and, for those who were brought up overseas, the schools they had attended. More overtly orthodox employees were reported by their peers more frequently as behaving suspiciously. We cannot, however, allow religious sensitivities to stand in the way of effective security protocols. If the insider threat is alive and well – and it is – our key defence is to better profile our fellow workmates. If that is the route we wish to go down, then we need to better educate them not to make ignorant decisions based on racial or religious stereotypes.

Screening staff, and their belongings, is also essential; the events of the last 16 months have demonstrated that bombs are more likely to make it onto aircraft through the actions of an insider than by a passenger. The technological advances, and the associated deterrent effect, need to have the same security impact on staff as they do on passengers. And, yet again, I call on the United States not to wait for a terrorist attack perpetrated by an industry insider before it introduces measures to mitigate that vulnerability; demand staff be screened now.

For years the aviation security industry has worked towards an idealised standard of security whereby passengers are only ever screened once at the onset of their journey, regardless of the number of transit stops. However, in the current climate, the concept of one-stop security is not only looking to be less achievable but also less desirable. Shannon Wandmaker discusses the reasons why this is so and, more positively, examines what is achievable to make the screening process more palatable to the travelling public, whilst also enhancing their protection.

In 47 years’ time, after teleportation makes the aviation industry redundant, or advances in virtual reality make travel unnecessary, some diligent Bachelor of History major is going to write a paper titled, ‘One-stop: the disconnect between idealism and reality in aviation security’. For the seven people who read it, the paper will come to an unremarkable and entirely predictable conclusion: one-stop aviation security never happened. Indeed, it never even came close to happening. Like poverty eradication and world peace, ‘one-stop security’ is more a rallying cry than an achievable goal, and for all the talk of harmonisation, mutual recognition and equivalence, very little progress is ever made.

It’s worth asking not only why this is, but also exploring whether one-stop security should even be the goal or whether there are better ways to improve aviation security outcomes and the passenger experience.

The idea of a seamless passenger experience – where the travelling public proceeds through security only at the start of the journey, and is not subjected to transit or transfer screening – has been around since the installation of the second walk-through metal detector. Yet in many ways, the world is further away from one-stop aviation security than ever before.

One reason is that one-stop goes against a fundamental building block of aviation security: the layered approach.

Like almost all critical processes in aviation, healthcare, engineering and other industries, redundancies are built into aviation security to ensure that, as much as possible, when something is missed there is an opportunity to rectify the mistake. Any transit screening point officer can give daily examples of prohibited items they have discovered on previously screened and cleared passengers.

The current passenger screening process is clumsy and antiquated. Layers of the existing process need to be updated or removed, and risk-based measures rather than a one size fits all approach should be implemented. Nevertheless, even the current methods of screening transit passengers still provide an opportunity to identify threats to the aviation network that have been missed on the first pass.

The fact that countries have different screening capabilities also provides a significant barrier to one-stop security, as highlighted by transit screeners routinely confiscating prohibited items.

How do we differentiate between an evacuation and an escape? Airports have long had evacuation plans for a variety of circumstances, from natural disasters to fire alarms and from significant weather events to security breaches. But lately the industry has had to come to terms with a new type of evacuation, one that is entirely different to the others: the chaotic, terrifying, run-for-your life escape. When a shooting starts, self-preservation instincts kick in and it’s about getting away from the gunfire by any means possible. But how can an airport effectively handle these most challenging types of evacuations? In the aftermath of the Fort Lauderdale attack, Jeffrey C. Price and Lori Beckman urge security personnel to plan for the worst, and examine the most common issues experienced by airports whose passengers and employees are forced to run for their lives.

Airports have seen an increase in attacks in the past few years. In the past four years, there has been an attack by a lone gunman at the Los Angeles International Airport, which killed a transportation security agent; suicide bombers at Brussels Airport; an active shooter team turned suicide bombers at the Istanbul Ataturk Airport, and the most recent, 6 January 2017, lone gunman attack in Florida at Ft. Lauderdale International Airport, which killed five people and wounded two others, to note just a few. When the shooting starts most people will instinctively bolt out any door or down any passageway in order to escape the murderous gunfire and explosions.

During this type of self-directed evacuation, people are likely to be pushed, shoved or trampled causing additional damage to property, injuries and possibly even fatalities. Additionally, emergency evacuations can cause upwards of half a million dollars of lost revenue with flight cancellations and delays, and potential lawsuits after the fact. Plus, the unplanned delays can delay and/or cause the cancellation of flights throughout the world. Airport operators will also be judged in the court of public opinion as the media will not only investigate the airport’s response, but also the ability of the airport to properly handle the evacuation and eventual repopulation of the terminal building. Despite the chaos and the confusion airports still have a responsibility to help manage the evacuation of the rest of the airport, and to get the airport open and operational as soon as possible. Many airports have taken actions ahead of time that may help save lives during the escape, and during the subsequent evacuations and repopulation of the terminal.

In taking protective actions, airport personnel have to make a variety of decisions, the most important of which is whether to actually evacuate or shelter-in-place. During weather events or natural disasters where putting people outdoors may actually place them at greater risk, the decision is typically made to shelter-in-place until the hazardous condition has passed. However, airports must be prepared to host hundreds or possibly thousands of people for a long period of time, hours and in some cases, several days. If keeping people inside the airport could result in their being in more danger then an evacuation is the preferred course of action. During an active shooter or airport assault, it’s possible that some people should shelter-in-place, while others need to be evacuated. Adding to this challenge is that these decisions need to be made very quickly, and decision-makers may not have all the information they need in order to make the decision.

The decision to shelter-in-place puts the airport operator in the position of hotelier. Even in a short-term situation – such as a passing thunderstorm or tornado – airports must have an effective method of notifying the airport population of the hazard, and have safe areas clearly marked and accessible by all passengers and personnel. For longer term sheltering, the airport should be prepared with additional food stores, blankets, cots, and medical supplies, as many passengers ignore the advice to keep medicines with them and will have checked their medicines in their hold baggage. Some passengers may have medicines that require refrigeration after a period of time.

Most of us go about our daily lives oblivious of the security measures put in place to protect us and the society we live in. We know, or at least hope, that the security services are doing their utmost to take necessary steps to guard against the next terrorist atrocity. However, when we fly we witness and experience enhanced security measures which in some respects reassure us, yet also force us to consider the degree to which our personal privacy can be invaded in the process; these measures, after all, have a serious impact on issues of fundamental human rights and civil liberties, including the rights to privacy and data protection, freedom of movement, the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In January 2017, and in light of the Executive Orders signed by newly elected President Trump limiting the travel of certain people based on their nationality or country of birth, this has become an ever more taxing issue. Olga Enerstvedt questions whether it is possible to satisfy both aviation security requirements and passengers’ civil liberty rights, or whether there is a contradiction between them.

On the one hand, states have a duty to maintain a high level of security, to adopt measures protecting persons, aircraft, airport facilities and other assets from harm. On the other hand, there are various instruments aimed at protecting human rights, and states are obliged to promote, respect, protect and fulfil them.

Balancing or Proportionality Test?
A common suggestion is to find a balance between liberty and security values. In other words, we should use the so-called ‘trade-off model’. In short, it is not possible to place greater emphasis on one of the values without detracting from the other.
However, in balancing terms, civil liberties will always be compromised. It is obvious that security, which is vital to survival, is more important than, for example, privacy, which is a social and political need but is not an immediate matter of survival. Only when security needs are satisfied is it possible to consider needs relating to civil liberties at all.

The balancing concept is subject to criticism; firstly because it justifies the compromises to civil liberties. It is suggested that, instead, the test of proportionality should be used. By using the latter, one can evaluate whether a security measure is suitable, necessary, without any less intrusive alternatives, non-excessive, and so on. Applying these criteria allows us to assess whether the human rights risks caused by this measure are proportionate to its security benefits and other factors.

Civil Liberties Risks
Unfortunately, in an article, one cannot look into civil liberties issues in aviation security in depth. Nevertheless, using the results of my previous extensive research, the risks relating to a number of emerging but increasingly used technologies – body scanners, camera surveillance (CCTV) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems – can be summarised in the table (Table 1, facing page).

In brief, to different extents, all of the indicated measures interfere with privacy and raise concerns in respect of a number of data protection principles, such as fair and lawful processing, proportionality, purpose limitation, minimality, and data subject influence.